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Abstract 
 
       In this paper, a framework for cryptographic 
protocol analysis using linear temporal logic is 
proposed. The framework can be used to specify and 
analyse security protocols. It aims to investigate and 
analyse the security protocols properties that are 
secure or have any flaws. The framework extends the 
linear temporal logic by including the knowledge of 
participants in each status that may change over the 
time. It includes two main parts, the Language of 
Temporal Logic (LTL) and the domain knowledge. 
The ability of the framework is demonstrated by 
analysing the Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol and the Andrew Secure RPC protocol as 
examples. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Designers of protocols use the trial-and-error 
method to design for analysing security protocols. 
Therefore, without the use of formal methods for the 
verification of protocols errors can remain 
undetected[1]. One of the advantages of formal 
verification is that it provides a systematic way to 
discover weaknesses in protocols. However, formal 
verification is not an easy task because there are 
wide ranges of complicated behaviours involved in 
verifying security protocols. A number of methods 
have been proposed by researchers to formally 
analyse security protocols [2]. Several researchers 
have developed formal methods with different 
techniques to raise assurance level in the correctness 
of security protocols. The BAN logic is one of the 
methods used early to prove security protocols.  
Burrows, Abadi and Needham developed the 
BAN logic method for analysing security properties 
of protocols. The BAN logic method is an important 
early attempt to examine the security of protocols. 
The BAN logic is a method for analysing the 
authentication of protocols [2,3]. However, the BAN 
logic is inappropriate to express the properties and 
processes of dynamic system as security protocols 
[4]. Subsequently, a number of researchers have 
worked to propose other formal logic for analysing 
the cryptographic protocols. For instance, semantics 
for the analysis of cryptographic protocols [5], and 
Syverson and van Oorschot have built a framework 
to unify some cryptographic protocol logics [6]. All 
of the proposed logics have syntax and semantic 
which can be used as a formal system for analysing 
the security protocols.  
Researchers have found that time is important to 
express the properties of security protocols. 
Temporal logic is a formal logic that can be used as a 
method for analysing security protocols. The 
temporal logic can specify dynamic systems that 
change over time[7]. The proposed framework has 
been built by combining temporal and epistemic 
logic. It can be used to guarantee the specific 
knowledge of participants over time[2].  
On the other side, Lei et al  agreed that temporal 
logic is suitable to reason the properties such as 
safety and liveness [8]. However, they have found 
that there are some difficulties in using temporal 
logic to model  security protocols. The difficulties 
are firstly, the time in the temporal logic is abstract, 
which is not appropriate to model protocols. 
Secondly, modelling security protocols needs to 
express a concrete process over a series of time that 
is hard to model by temporal logic. For these reason 
Lei et al built a framework that can express the time 
dependent properties[8]. 
The framework presented in this paper will use 
linear temporal logic to present the knowledge of 
participants over running the protocol. It analyses the 
knowledge in each state of the protocol to ensure 
participants have knowledge they should know at 
specific states. It describes what participants do not 
know and what they should not known at specific 
states of the protocol. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will 
present the framework that includes two parts, the 
language of the logic and the domain knowledge. 
Section 3 will describe the steps of Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol. Section 4 will show 
how the framework can be used to analyse the 
Needham-Schroeder public key protocol. Section 5 
will illustrate the Andrew Secure RPC protocol 
steps. Section 6 will shows how we can analyse the 
protocol and detect the Claek-Jacob Attack by use 
the framework. Section 7 will present conclusions 
and future work. 
 
2.The framework 
 
This proposed framework is based on linear 
temporal logic. The knowledge-based framework is 
proposed to prove the correctness of security 
International Journal of Digital Society (IJDS), Volume 4, Issues 1 and 2, March/June 2013
Copyright © 2013, Infonomics Society 749
  
protocols. The language of the logic is used to write 
protocol steps and to represent the properties of 
protocols in a formal language. 
 
2.1. The language of temporal logic 
 
This part is representing the syntax and semantics 
language of the framework. The language is 
basically an instance of linear temporal logic. 
 
2.1.1. Syntax of the language of temporal logic 
The Language of temporal logic is composed of an 
alphabet, terms, formulae, axioms and deduction 
rules of the framework as follows: 
 
Definition 1 (Alphabet):  The alphabet of the logic 
language is based on symbols defined in [9], and was 
extended by adding the statuses and temporal 
operators that are appropriate to the proposed 
framework. The alphabet for the framework is as 
follows: 
a.             (Constants). 
b.             (Variables). 
c.          (Function symbols). 
d.          (Predicates). 
e. ⋀   ⋁              (Logical connectives). 
f.            (Temporal operators). 
g.       (Quantifiers). 
h.             (Statuses). 
i.  (    )        .  (Punctuation marks). 
   
Definition 2 (Operation       , Next and binary 
relation  ): Let   be the set of statuses and       
and   be time of occurrence, then the status function 
can be defined as follows [10]: 
a. Next      Next (   )   ( )   ( )   . 
b. The operation       applies to status   
then will give status    such that Next 
(    ). 
c.            ( )   ( ). 
 
Definition 3 (Terms): Let   be the set of constant 
symbols,   be the set of variables and   be the set of 
functions. The set of terms   can be defined as 
follows: 
a.       . 
b. If     and               , then 
  (          )    where       
c. The set of all terms is created from (a) and (b). No 
other string is a term. 
 
Definition 4 (Formula): Let   be a set of variables,   
be a set of predicate symbols,   be a set of terms. 
And   a set of statuses. The set of formulas   can be 
defined as follows: 
a. If                       and      then 
 (              )    where    . It can be 
called atomic formula. 
b. If     then (   )   . 
c. If     and     then the follows are formulas: 
            and    . 
d. If      and     then the follows are formula: 
        
        
e. If     then the follows are formulas: 
       
      
       
 
To know the truth of a formula at a moment in 
time, a status formula is introduced by defining the 
set   that includes all individual statuses in the path. 
The set   can be defined as follows: 
                     where    . 
 
Now the definition of formula can be extended as 
follows: 
 
Definition 5 (Extended Formula): Let     where   
is the set of formulas, and         where   is the 
set of statuses, then the follows are formulas: 
a.  (  )  
b. Next (      )  
c.      . 
 
In Addition, there are a number of axioms and 
deduction rules used in the framework which will be 
introduced later. The deduction rules include three 
kinds of rules: propositional rules, temporal rules and 
quantifier rules. 
 
2.1.2. Semantics of the language of temporal logic 
To give the semantics of the language of temporal 
logic, which is based on the Kripke structure model 
[11], we will firstly define the Kripke structure. 
 
Definition 6 (Kripke Structure): Let   denote the 
suffix of the path             . and   be a set of 
atomic propositions which is not empty. A Kripke 
structure is a four tuple  (        ), where 
a.   is a finite set of statuses, 
b.    is the current status, 
c.       is a transition relation, for which it 
holds that             (    )   , 
d.          is labelling, a function which labels 
each status with atomic propositions which hold in 
this status. 
 
Definition 7 (The model): Assume   is a Kripke 
structure, and   is a path in  . If the well-formed 
formula   is satisfied in the path   at specific status 
  , it can be abbreviated as 〈    〉   . The relation 
   can be define as follows: 
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〈    〉   (  )                                       
 〈    〉     (  )                   〈    〉    (  )  
〈    〉   (  )    (  )     〈    〉   (  )  
and〈    〉   (  ) 
〈    〉   (  )    (  )     〈    〉   (  )  
or〈    〉   (  ) 
〈    〉   (  )   (  )     〈    〉   (  )  
or〈    〉   (  ) 
   〈    〉  
   (  )      
                      
           〈    〉   (  ) 
〈    〉     (  )                       
          〈    〉   (  ) 
〈    〉    (  )      〈      〉   (    )                
 
2.2. The domain knowledge  
        
The domain knowledge defines the knowledge of 
agents who are participants during the running of a 
protocol.  In the domain knowledge, three types of 
participants involved in the protocol are defined. The 
first type is a server or trusted third party. The 
second type is a friend agent, including all legitimate 
agents participating the protocol. The third type is a 
malicious agent or attacker, which includes agents 
trying to obtain information during running the 
protocol in an unauthorised way. 
 
Definition 8 (Agents): 
                                 
 
Agents can generate random numbers called 
Nonces. A Nonce should be fresh and unique for 
identifying a protocol session. Also, the domain 
knowledge has defined two types of keys. For the 
asymmetric cryptosystem there is a public and a 
private key. For a symmetric cryptosystem there is a 
shared session key. The time during running the 
protocol can be divided into statuses each of which 
indicates a moment of time. The agents use messages 
to talk over the network, where the combination of 
two messages and can be represented as 〈     〉. In 
the domain knowledge there are different types of 
messages as defined below. 
 
Definition 9 (Message):   
               ( )      ( )    ( )   
    ( )         (   )     (   )       (   )  
     (     ). 
 
There are actions, functions and predicates used 
to represent the processes and properties in the 
protocol. Let   and   be agents and  be message, 
the agent   can generate a new message using the 
action          (    ). The agent   can send the 
message  to the agent   and receive message  by 
using the actions      (     ) and    (   ) 
respectively. There are a number of functions 
an agent might use to help in the network 
to meet the cryptographic requirements. 
There are two kinds of functions depending 
on the techniques of the cryptographic 
protocols, which are either symmetric or 
asymmetric. The asymmetric functions are 
defined as follows: 
    ( ): denoting the public encryption 
key of agent  . 
    ( ): denoting the private encryption 
key of agent  . 
    ( ): denoting the public signature 
key of agent    
    ( )  denoting the private signature 
key of agent  . 
 
On the other hand, the framework defines one 
symmetric function as follows: 
     (     ): denoting that agents   and   
share the symmetric key  . In some cases, two 
agents might share two or more symmetric keys, 
which should be distinguished from each other. 
 
A predicate takes parameters and returns true or 
false. The framework defines some predicates to 
describe the knowledge of agents. There are a 
number of predicates identified as follows: 
      (      ): denoting at status    agent   
knows the message  . Either the agent   has 
generated the message   or received from 
another agent. 
     (        )   denoting at status    the 
message   has not been altered when sent to 
agent   from agent  . 
     (      ): denoting at status   , agent   
verifies the message . 
        (        )  denoting at status   , the 
message   is contained within the message  . 
      (      )  denoting at status   , two 
elements of messages or agents are same as each 
other. 
 
2.3. Assumption and rules  
 
There are a number of security assumptions and 
rules used to prove the properties of security 
protocols. The security assumptions are agreed by 
most of researchers in the protocol verification field 
[12]. The rules are used to infer new knowledge at 
the current status. The assumptions and rules have 
been formulated as follows: 
Assumption 1: The symmetric key must originally 
only be known by the two agents who share the key. 
No other agent or spy can know this key. 
         (   )  (   )  
      (      (     (     ))). 
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Assumption 2: The public key of a legitimate agent 
is known to all agents in the network. 
          (     (   ( )))  
 
Assumption 3: Every agent knows his own private 
key. 
       (     (   ( ))). 
 
Assumption 4: The private key must not be sent over 
the network. 
     (    )         (       (   ( ))). 
 
Assumption 5: Over the network an attacker should 
not be a friend or the server. 
    (          )  (        )  (  
      ). 
 
 Assumption 6: For all keys,     is the inverse of the 
key  . The equation is   (   )  . 
     (   )   
 
Rule 1: If an agent   knows message   and the key 
 , then the agent can use the key to encrypt the 
message. The final result is that the agent can know 
the encrypted messages. 
     (      )       (        ( ))
    (            (   ))
 
 
Rule 2: If agent   knows the message   encrypted 
with the key   and knows the corresponding  
decryption key, then   can use the decryption key to 
decrypt the message. The final result is that the agent 
can know the content of the original message. 
    (            (   ))      (        ( 
  ))
    (      )
 
 
Rule 3: If agent   knows two different messages, 
then the agent can combine them. 
    (       )      (       )       
    (            )
 
 
Rule 4: If agent   knows that there are two messages 
combined together, then the agent can separate them. 
    (     〈     〉)
    (       )      (       )
 
 
Rule 5: If agent   sends a message   to another 
agent  , then agent   must know this message 
before he sends it. 
    (        )            
    (      )
 
 
Rule 6: The attacker can eavesdrop all messages in 
the network. 
    (        )
   (             )
 
 
Rule 7: If agent   has received a message   then   
should know the content of this message, and nobody 
can force agent   to delete this message. 
   (      )            
     (      )
 
 
Rule 8: If agent   receives a message   at moment   
then there is another agent who sent this message to 
  before the moment  . 
        (        )
   (      )           
 
 
3. The Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol 
  
The Needham-Schroeder public key (NSPK) 
protocol is a simple protocol with just three steps and 
it has a known flaw. The flaw was found by Lowe in 
1995 [13]. The aim of NSPK is achieving 
successfully established authentication between two 
agents  ,   who are named the initiator and 
responder respectively. The three steps of the NSPK 
protocol can be represented as following: 
 
                     ( )   
                     ( )   
                   ( )   
 
Note: 
1.            ( ):Two messages     are combined 
and encrypted by the agent  ’s public key. 
2.  : It denotes the random number generated by the 
agent   that should be unique and unknown to other 
agents. It is called a nonce. 
The messages of NSPK can be described as 
follows: 
Message 1: The agent   initiates the protocol by 
sending to agent   an encrypted message that 
containing  's identity and nonce encrypted with  's 
public key.                     
Message 2: If   receives message 1,   can know    
by decrypting the message. Then,   responds to   by 
sending a message encrypted with public key of   
containing the nonce    and a sender nonce    
which is generate by  . 
Message 3: If   receives message 2,   can know    
by decrypting the message. Then,   responds to   by 
sending a message encrypted with the public key of 
  containing nonce   . 
 
After running the protocol, the agent   can be 
sure that he or she talks to agent  . In the same way, 
agent   can be sure that he or she talks to the agent 
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 . Lowe has shown that this is not true as explained 
in the next section. 
 
4. Analysis of Needham-Schroeder public 
key protocol 
 
In this section, the framework presented in the 
section 2 will be used to investigate the NSPK 
protocol as a case study. There are four steps that are 
guidelines for proving the correctness of security 
protocols [12]. This part will follow these four step 
to analyse the NSPK protocol. 
 
4.1. Adjusting the framework 
 
There are some minor differences among security 
protocols where each protocol has different security 
objectives. In this step, the framework will be 
adjusted slightly to the specifications of the NSPK 
protocol. 
In the NSPK protocol there are two honest agents 
(  and  ) and an attacker. Hence, the types of agent 
can be defined as follows: 
                           
 
And the set of friends is defined as: 
              
 
So, the assumption of attacker can be changed 
according to the definition of the agents, as follows: 
          (          )  (          ) 
 
4.2. Modelling the protocol 
 
In this step, the three steps of the NSPK protocol 
will be converted from an informal language as 
written in section 3 to a formal language using the 
frameworks notations as follows: 
 
          (           (〈       ( )〉     
(   ( )))). 
 
          (           (〈       ( )〉     
(   ( )))      (            
(〈     ( )      ( )〉    (   ( )))). 
 
           (            
(〈     ( )      ( )〉    (   ( )))) 
      (            (     ( )  
   (   ( )))). 
 
These three steps above are enough for the 
friends (honest users) to successfully run the 
protocol. On the other hand, it should not be 
overlooked that the attacker does not necessarily 
follow the protocol rules. According to the 
assumptions and rules in the framework, from the 
fake message rule and the attacker rule two 
additional rules can be used: 
 
                            (             
       (〈       ( )〉     (   ( )))   
    (                   (〈     ( )      ( )〉   
   (   (        )))). 
 
                            (            
        (〈     ( )      ( )〉    (   ( )))) 
      (                   (     ( )  
   (   (        )))). 
 
4.3. Proving basic properties 
 
There are a number of basic properties that are 
common among most of protocols such as knowing 
the content of received message. The basic properties 
of the protocol need to be proved. All these basic 
properties can be reused in proving other protocols. 
In this paper we will prove two basic properties. 
The lemma 1 will be proved, (Knowledge of 
message):     (     )      (   ). This 
lemma consists of one goal, which is     (   ) 
and one antecedent, which is      (     ). The 
lemma says that, if agent   sends message   to 
another agent  , the agent   can read the message 
 . The steps of proving the lemma 1 are as follows: 
 
       (      ) Consequent 
          assumption 
        (      ) 1,2,always elimination 
rule 
          assumption 
       (      ) 3,4, rule 7 
           assumption 
           (        ) 5,6, rule 8 
      (        ) 7,Existential  
introduction rule 
9.done  
 
    The lemma 2 will be proved, (Knowing encrypt 
message):     (          (     (   ( )))) 
     (   ). This lemma consists of one goal, 
which is    (   ) and one antecedent, which is 
    (         (     (   ( )))). The lemma  
says that if agent   know message   encrypted 
using  's public key, then agent   can know the 
content of message  . The steps of proving the 
lemma 2 are as follows: 
      (      ) Consequent 
        assumption 
      (             
(     (   ( ))))  
      (        (   ( ))) 
1,2, rule 2 
      (        (   ( )))  3, conjunction 
introduction rule 
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                   4, assumption3 
       (             
(     (   ( ))))  
3, conjunction 
introduction rule 
        
 
4.4. Proving security properties 
 
Proving the correctness of the NSPK protocol 
will be based on the nonce secrecy. If agent   and 
agent   have successfully completed a run of the 
protocol, then   should believe that   is his partner 
if and only if   believes that he is talking to  . So, 
there are two properties, which are important to 
prove the correctness of the NSPK protocol: 
 )                           
     (              ( )). 
B)                             
     (              ( )). 
 
With the assumption that nonces will never be 
sent out over the network without encryption, the 
attacker does not have the opportunity to know the 
value of the nonces unless somebody sends the 
nonces encrypted by the attacker's public key. 
                             (          
     (       ))      (             
       (     (       )    (   (        ))))  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lowe Attack: Lowe (1995) found that in step 3 of 
the protocol there is a potential attack. The figure 1 
shows the six steps to break the protocol [13]. If we 
assume agent   sends  's nonce to the attacker, then 
by reviewing the steps of the protocol backwards we 
can easily find the attacker can be impersonating 
another principal (agent  ) and illegally knows the 
value of  's nonce.  As shown in Table1  at session 
1, step 3, agent   has sent  's nonce to the attacker, 
before session 2 has been completed. Therefore, the 
attack breaks the secrecy of the nonces. 
 
 
 
Session Step Sent to Message 
Seession1 Step1              
Seession2 Step1  ( )             
Seession2 Step2    ( )           
Seession1 Step2               
Seession1 Step3            
Seession2 Step3  ( )           
 
The scripts show the attack can know B’s nonce 
before agent B as follows: 
 
      (                 ( )) Consequent 
           Assumption 
      (                    
(     ( )    (   (        ))))  
1, lemma 2  
      (                      
(     ( )    (   (        )))) 
2,3, lemma1 
           assumption 
      (                     ( 
〈     ( )      ( )〉    (    
( )))) 
4, 5, Reply 
NS3 to 
Attacker 
           assumption 
      (                   ( 
〈     ( )      ( )〉    (    
( )))) 
6,7, rule 5 
           assumption 
       (                     ( 
〈     ( )      ( )〉    (    
(        )))) 
8,9, 
lemma 1 
            assumption 
       (                
       (〈     ( )      ( )〉 
    (   ( ))))   
10,11, Reply 
NS2 to 
Attacker 
       (                   ( 
〈     ( )      ( )〉    (    
( )))) 
12, fake 
message 
       (              
〈     ( )       ( )〉)  
      (               (    
( ))) 
13, rule 1 
        (               (    
( )))  
14, conjunction 
introduction 
rule 
                    15, assumption2 
17.     (              
〈     ( )       ( )〉)  
14, conjunction 
introduction 
rule 
       (                   ( 
〈     ( )       ( )〉    (    
(        ))))  
15, lemma 2 
            assumption 
       (                     ( 
〈     ( )      ( )〉    (    
(        )))) 
18, 19, lemma1 
         
 
 
 
The framework has used to analyse the NSPK 
protocol. The ability of the framework demonstrated 
by detects the Lowe attack. Also, there are two basic 
properties have proved and used in the analysis of 
A                             Attacker                          B 
            
           
            
            
         
         
Figure1. Attack NSPK protocol 
Table1. Attacking the Needham-Schroder 
protocol by Lowe. 
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NSPK protocol. Hence, the framework can analyse 
complex protocols to discover a new flaws.          
 
 
 
5. The Andrew secure RPC protocol 
 
The Andrew Secure RPC protocol (ASRPC) aims 
to authenticate handshake among two agents. This 
protocol purposes to provide the client   which a 
new session Key    
  from the server  , whereas 
both   and   have already had a shared session key 
    [14]. The four steps of the ASRPC protocol can 
be represented as following: 
 
                  
                   
                  
           
          
 
The messages of ASRPC can be described as 
follows: 
Message 1: The agent   initiates the protocol by 
sending to server   a message containing  's identity 
unencrypted and  ’s nonce    encrypted with the 
share session key    . 
Message 2: If   receives message 1,   can know    
by decrypting the message. Then,   responds to   by 
sending a message encrypted with     containing the 
nonce    and a new nonce    ,which is generated by 
 . 
Message 3: If   receives message 2,   can know    
by decrypting the message. Then,   responds to   
after it checks and is satisfied with content of 
message 2 by sending a message encrypted with     
containing nonce   . 
Message 4: If   receives message 3,   will send a 
new session key      with   s new nonce     by a 
message encrypted with    .  
After successfully running the protocol, the client 
  can be sure that he or she is authenticated by 
server  . Also, a fresh new session key      can be 
used to exchange the data with server  . However, 
Burrows et al in 1989 found that the client   cannot 
ensure that the    
 is fresh [14]. In addition, Clark 
and Jacob proposed a typing attack in which an 
intruder eavesdrop the message 2 then resend it as 
substitutes in place of message 4. The Clark and 
Jacob attack is shown in next section.   
 
6. Analysis of the Andrew Secure RPC 
protocol 
 
As we have done in the section 4, The framework 
in section 2 will be used to analyse ASRPC protocol 
and find the Clark and Jacob attack. The steps of 
guidelines for proving the correctness of security 
protocols will be followed. 
 
6.1. Adjusting the framework 
 
In the ASRPC protocol there are two honest 
agents (         and server  ) and an attacker. 
Hence, the type of agents can be defined as follows: 
                          
 
And there are three different nonces 
which are    for client   and    and     
for server  . Moreover, in this protocol 
there are two session keys which are     
and      . 
 
6.2. Modelling the ASRPC protocol 
      
The four steps of the ASRPC protocol will be 
converted from an informal language as written in 
section 5 to a formal language using the frameworks 
notations as follows: 
 
ASRPC 1       (      
〈         (      (     (     )))〉) 
 
             (      
〈         (      (     (     )))〉) 
      (            (〈        〉     
(      (     )))). 
 
             (            (〈        〉     
(      (     ))))       (            (〈   
  〉    (     (     )))).  
 
             (            (〈     〉      
(      (     ))))          (             
(〈 (      (     ))   
 
 〉    (     (     ))))   
 
These four steps are able to achieve the aim of 
protocol carrying out authentication handshake 
among two agents and agreement in a new session 
key     . On the other hand, it should not be 
overlooked that the attacker does not necessarily 
follow the protocol rules. According to the 
assumptions and rules in the framework, the attacker 
can eavesdrop all messages and the fake message 
rule can be used: 
 
                                 (             
(〈        〉     (      (     ))))       
(                (〈        〉    (      
 (     ))))   
 
6.3. Proving basic properties 
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The basic properties are usually suitable to be 
used within various protocols. Therefore, we will 
use the basic properties in the section 4.3.   
 
6.4. Proving security properties 
 
Proving the correctness of the ASRPC Protocol 
will be based on executing the successful handshake 
and agreeing the new session key    . If client A 
and server B have successfully completed a run of 
the protocol, then A should believe that new key 
session      is fresh and client A will use this key 
for next session. So, there is a property which can be 
used to prove the correctness of the NSPK protocol:   
 
                                        
        (         (〈  
      〉    (     
(     ))) ) 
 
We assume that the client   and server   share 
session key    , and all messages are never sent out 
without encrypted by     over the network. With 
these assumptions the attacker has no chance to 
know or modify the value of new session key    
 . 
However, the attacker can send a fake message 
which has same format of a message as the new 
session key    
  to client  . In this case, the attacker 
can bogus the    
  and convince the client   to 
accept it [1,15].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claek-Jacob Attack: The ASRPC protocol has a 
potential attack found in 1996 by Claek and Jacob. 
The figure 2 shows the sequence steps to attack the 
protocol. If we assume that the attacker is able to 
send a fake message and eavesdrop all messages, the 
attacker can impersonate server   and reply the 
message 2 to client   when the client   sends the 
message 3 to server  . At the end, client   accepts 
the       to be the new session key with server 
 [15]. 
 
The scripts below show the attack has ability to 
achieve Clark-Jacob attack through impersonate 
server B and replying message 2. 
 
       (     〈        〉 ) Consequent 
           Assumption 
      (            (〈   
     〉      (     
(     ))))        
(        (    (     )
  ))  
1, rule 2 
      (        (    (     )
  )) 3, 
conjunction 
introductio
n rule 
                   4, 
assumption 6 
      (             
(〈        〉      (     
(     ))))   
3, 
conjunction 
introductio
n rule 
        (                      
(〈        〉      (     
(     )))) 
2,6, lemma 
1 
        assumption 
      (                    
(〈        〉     
(     (     ))))  
7,8,  fake 
message 
                       
        (                     
(〈           〉    (     
(     ))))  
9,10, 
always  
elimination 
rule 
               assumption 
        (                    
(〈        〉     
(      (     ))))  
11,12, rule 
7 
       (               
(〈        〉     (      
(     )))) 
13,Eavesdro
p attacker 
ASRPC 2 
           assumption 
     (              (        
(     (     )))) 
14,15, 
ASRPC 2 
      
 
7. Conclusion and future work 
 
In this paper, a framework was presented that can 
be used to analyse security protocols. The framework 
approach is linear temporal logic with statuses, 
which is used to prove the correctness of security 
protocols. The NSPK protocol and ASRPC protocol, 
which are well known security protocols used to 
prove that the framework is capable of detecting 
flaws. The result of the proof is that the framework 
detected the known flaws in these two protocols. 
A                             Attacker                           B 
                
                          
          
             
Figure 2. Attack ASRPC protocol 
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Future work will focus on investigating other 
protocols using the framework in order to identify 
the unknown flaws. 
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